Obergefell vs Hodges

The landmark case of Obergefell vs Hodges upheld the rights of same-sex couples to marry. The US Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex based on the following principles and premises:

(1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices
defining personal identity and beliefs.

(2) Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.

(a) The first premise of this Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.

(b) A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals. The intimate association protected by this right was central to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of married couples to use contraception.

(c) A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.

(d) Finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social order. States have contributed to the fundamental character of marriage by placing it at the center of many facets of the legal and social order. There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle, yet same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage and are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would find intolerable. It is demeaning to lock same-sex couples out of a central institution of the Nation’s society, for they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage.
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.


(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.

(4) The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.  Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.

(5) While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental
right.

La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. Vs Ramos

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 127882;  January 27, 2004

FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules and regulations and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by the government with Western Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase “Agreements involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance” contained in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its implementing rules and regulations – insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a private corporation, the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual control of the business.

Republic vs Naguiat

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006

FACTS:

Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.

 Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

ISSUE:

Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?

HELD:

No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same. 

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory Construction

GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995

FACTS:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:

Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:

LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

Tano vs Socrates

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997

FACTS:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

Oposa vs Factoran

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

           1.       Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

           2.       Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

           1.       Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

           2.       The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Secretary of DENR vs Yap

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws: Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008

FACTS:

This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.

On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE:

 Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD:

No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.